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We assume that a database of personal information comprises records of individuals that contain
conﬁdential or sensitive ﬁelds. Queries about the distribution of a sensitive ﬁeld within a selected
population in the database can be submitted to the data center. However, the answers to the queries
may leak conﬁdential information about some individuals, even though no identiﬁcation informa-
tion is provided. Inspired by decision theory, we present two quantitative models for privacy protec-
tion in such a database query or linkage environment. One models the value of information from the
viewpoint of the querier, while the other models the damage caused by and compensation for privacy
leakage.
In both models, we deﬁne the information state by a class of probability distributions on a set of
possible conﬁdential values. These states can be modiﬁed and reﬁned by the user’s knowledge acqui-
sition behavior. In the ﬁrst model, the value of information is deﬁned as the expected gain of the
querier, and privacy is protected by imposing costs on the answers to the queries to balance any
potential gain. In the second model, the safety of information is guaranteed by ensuring that anyone
misusing private information must pay more compensation than the value of the possible gain.
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Although privacy protection has recently received a great deal of attention in the data
analysis community [1,5,13,12,2,9], there are still many technical problems that need to be
addressed. The most basic problem is how to prevent unauthorized users gaining access to
conﬁdential information. In many cases, even if the conﬁdential information is only
known imprecisely, there is still a risk of privacy leakage. Thus, it is very important to have
the capability of risk assessment in a model for privacy protection.
Some people or groups may beneﬁt from privacy leakage; however, others may be
harmed. The value of conﬁdential information could be an incentive to invade a person’s
privacy and information brokers may therefore try to collect and sell such information for
their own gain. On the other hand, it is usually diﬃcult to estimate the damage caused by
privacy leakage. However, to discourage the invasion of privacy, the damage to the victim
must be appropriately compensated by the party disseminating the information. There-
fore, the evaluation of the potential gain or loss caused by privacy leakage is a crucial
problem in privacy protection.
In this paper, we address the problem in terms of the value of information and the dam-
age caused by privacy leakage. We focus on the following database query environment.
Private information about individuals is stored in a data center, and there are conﬁdential
or sensitive ﬁelds, as well as identiﬁcation ﬁelds, in each record. Queries about the distri-
bution of a sensitive ﬁeld within a selected population in the database can be submitted to
the data center, but the answers to queries may leak conﬁdential information about indi-
viduals, even though no identiﬁcation is provided.
We study two quantitative models for privacy protection in such a database query
environment. One models the value of information from the viewpoint of the querier,
while the other deals with the damage caused by and compensation for privacy leakage.
For the former, we model the value of information as the expected gain from knowledge
of the information. For the latter, the safety of data is guaranteed by ensuring that any-
one disseminating private information without authorization must pay more compensa-
tion than the beneﬁt he can derive from such behavior. In both models, we need to
represent the knowledge states of a user receiving certain kinds of information. The user
can change or reﬁne his information state by obtaining certain answers to a query. Thus,
we also need a formalism to represent the data to be protected and a language to
describe the kinds of queries that are allowed. The data table and decision logic pro-
posed in [19] are employed as the data representation formalism and the query language
respectively.
In the remainder of the paper, we review the data table formalism and the decision logic
in our application context in Section 2. The basic components of our models—the infor-
mation state and knowledge acquisition behavior—are deﬁned in Section 3. In Sections 4
and 5, respectively, we present a model for the value of information and a model for the
damage caused by and compensation for privacy leakage. In Section 6, we discuss related
works. Finally, in Section 7, we summarize the results of our work.
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To state the privacy protection problem, we must ﬁrst formalize data representation.
The most popular form of data representation is a data table [19]. The data in many appli-
cation domains, for example, medical records, ﬁnancial transactions, employee data, etc.,
can be represented as data tables. A data table can be seen as a simpliﬁcation of a rela-
tional database, since the latter usually consists of a number of data tables. A formal
deﬁnition of a data table is given in [19].
Deﬁnition 1. A data table1 is a pair T = (U,A) such that
• U is a non-empty ﬁnite set of individuals, called the population or the universe,
• A is a non-empty ﬁnite set of primitive attributes, and
• every primitive attribute a 2 A is a total function a : U! Va, where Va is the set of
values of a, called the domain of a.
The attributes of a data table can be divided into three sets. The ﬁrst contains the key
attributes, which can be used to identify to whom a data record belongs; therefore, these
attributes are always masked oﬀ in response to a query. It does not matter whether the set
contains a single key or multiple keys, since they must be removed or encrypted before the
data is released. As the key attributes uniquely determine an individual, we can assume
that they are associated with elements in the universe U and omit them hereafter. Second,
we have a set of easy-to-know attributes, the values of which can be discovered easily by the
public. For example, in [22], it is pointed out that some attributes like birth-date, gender,
ethnicity, etc., are included in some public databases, such as census data or voter regis-
tration lists. The last set of attributes is the conﬁdential type, the values of which are the
goals we have to protect. Sometimes, there is an asymmetry between the values of a con-
ﬁdential attribute. For example, if the attribute is a HIV test result, the revelation of a ‘‘+’’
value may cause a serious invasion of privacy, whereas it does not matter if it is known
that an individual has a ‘‘’’ value. For simplicity, we assume there is exactly one conﬁ-
dential attribute in a data table. Thus, a data table is usually written as T = (U,A [ {c}),
where A is the set of easy-to-know attributes and c is the conﬁdential attribute.
Let Vc = {s0, s1, . . . , st1} be the set of possible values for the conﬁdential attribute c. It
is assumed that the a priori information of a user is the probability distribution of the pop-
ulation on Vc. In other words, we assume that the user knows the value
jfu2U jcðuÞ¼sigj
jU j for all
0 6 i 6 t  1; therefore, he can improve his knowledge by investigating some sampled
individuals of the population, or by querying the data center that stores the data table.
By such investigation, the user can discover the exact value of the conﬁdential attribute
of the chosen individuals. However, a great deal of eﬀort is necessary to conduct the inves-
tigation. On the other hand, a query may ask for the probability distribution of sensitive
ﬁelds in a speciﬁc subset of the population. Once the query is correctly answered, the user
not only knows the probability distribution of the speciﬁc sub-population, but also that of
its complement on Vc. Thus, we need a language to specify a subset of individuals. To1 Also called a knowledge representation system, information system, or attribute-value system.
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nally designed to represent rules induced from a data table by data mining techniques.
However, it is also perfectly suitable for querying a data table, since each formula of
the logic is satisﬁed by some individuals in the data table.
The atomic formula of a data table T = (U,A [ {c}) is of the form (a,v), where a 2 A is
an easy-to-know attribute and v 2 Va is a possible value of the attribute a. The well-formed
formulas (wﬀ) of the logic are then formed by the Boolean connectives negation (), con-
junction (^), disjunction (_), and implication (!):
• Each atomic formula is a wﬀ.
• If u is a wﬀ, so is u.
• If u and w are wﬀs, so are u ^ w, u _ w, and u! w.
The satisfaction relation T between U and the wﬀs is deﬁned recursively by the follow-
ing clauses:
(1) uT(a,v) iﬀ a(u) = v,
(2) u T u iﬀ u KT u,
(3) u T u ^ w iﬀ u T u and u T w,
(4) u T u _ w iﬀ u T u or u T w,
(5) u T u! w iﬀ u KT u or u T w.
Intuitively, it is clear any individual satisfying (a,v) has v as the value of his attribute a.
Based on the semantics of decision logic, we deﬁne the truth set of a wﬀ u with
respect to the data table T, denoted by kukT, as {u 2 Uju T u}. Thus, each wﬀ u
speciﬁes a subset of individuals kukT in the data table. When a user submits a query
u to the data center, it means that he wants to know the distribution of the sub-popu-
lation kukT on Vc. If the query is correctly answered, by the axioms of probability, the
user would also simultaneously know the distribution of the sub-population U  kukT.
In other words, a correctly answered query would partition the population into two sub-
populations and the distributions of their conﬁdential attribute values would be known.
In this way, the user could subsequently query the data center to reﬁne his knowledge
regarding the distribution of the conﬁdential attribute values in each sub-population.
To model the evolution of the user’s information states after diﬀerent queries, we need
a formal representation of those states. Section 3 is devoted to the deﬁnitions of such a
representation.
Example 1. Let us use the data table in Fig. 1, which contains data about 100 individuals,
to illustrate the deﬁnitions. The key attribute of the table is ‘‘ID’’; the easy-to-know
attributes are ‘‘Age’’ and ‘‘Sex’’; and the conﬁdential attribute is ‘‘Disease’’. The values of
‘‘Age’’ indicate ‘‘less than 30’’ (1), ‘‘between 30 and 60’’ (2), and ‘‘greater than 60’’ (3),
whereas the values of ‘‘Disease’’ indicate‘‘normal’’ (0) and ‘‘ill’’ (1). We group indivi-
duals with the same attribute values together. For example, the ﬁrst row represents all
males younger than 30 who do not have a disease. We add the last column to denote the
count of individuals with a speciﬁc combination of values. In addition, (Sex,M) and
(Sex,F) ^ (Age,2) are two examples of decision logic wffs; thus we have [k(Sex,M)kT =
{u1  u20,u31  u50,u71  u85} and k(Sex,F) ^ (Age,2)kT = {u51  u70}.
Fig. 1. An example of a data table.
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Hereafter, we denote a data table as T = (U,A [ {c}). Let Vc = {s0, s1, . . . , st1} be the
set of possible values for the conﬁdential attribute, and let U = {u1,u2, . . . ,un} be the set of
individuals. A logical partition of U is a subset of DL wﬀs P = {u1,u2, . . . ,um} such that
ku1kT [    [ kumkT = U and kuikT \ kujkT = ; if i5 j. Each kuikT is called an equiva-
lence class of P. A piece of information (or knowledge) known to the user is given by a
logical partition of U, a set of probability distributions indexed by the wﬀs of the partition,
and the number of investigated individuals. In the following, we use juj to denote the
cardinality of kukT.
Deﬁnition 2. An information state (or a knowledge state) I for the set of possible
conﬁdential attribute values Vc and the set of individuals U is a triple (P, (li)06i6t1,
(ji)06i6t1), whereP is a logical partition of U, and for all 0 6 i 6 t  1, li : P! [0, 1] and
ji : P! @0 (@0 denotes the set of natural numbers) are functions satisfying the following
constraints for any u 2 P,
(i)
Pt1
i¼0liðuÞ ¼ 1;
(ii) juj Æ li(u) is a natural number, and
(iii) ji(u) 6 juj Æ li(u).
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(l0, . . . ,lt1) and j = (j0, . . . ,jt1) denote vector mappings that can be applied to elements
ofP. The result is a vector containing of the results of applying its component functions to
the element. The dimension of each vector is self-evident from the context; therefore it is
not explicitly speciﬁed. Based on the vector notation, information state deﬁned above can
be denoted by (P,l,j). Let I be such an information state; then (P,l) is called a partial
knowledge state compatible with I. Note that a partial knowledge state may be compat-
ible with various information states.
Within an information state, the user partitions the population into a number of sub-
populations, and knows the probability distribution of the conﬁdential attribute values
of each sub-population. Intuitively, li(u) is the proportion of individuals in sub-popula-
tion kukT who have the conﬁdential attribute value si, whereas ji(u) is the number of
investigated individuals in sub-population kukT who have conﬁdential attribute value
si. Since each DL wﬀ u is composed of atomic formulas with easy-to-know attributes
only, it can be assumed that it would take little eﬀort for the user to verify whether a
given individual satisﬁes u. Furthermore, it can also be assumed that the cardinality
of the truth set of each u is known to the public. However, note that it may sometimes
be very diﬃcult for the user to locate an individual who satisﬁes a speciﬁc u among the
whole population U.
A user can change his information state by his subsequent investigation of some indi-
viduals in a speciﬁc sub-population and by his queries to, and the answers obtained from,
the data center. This is a process of knowledge reﬁnement and can be modeled by the
knowledge acquisition behavior as follows.
A logical partition P2 is a reﬁnement of another logical partition P1, denoted by
P2 v P1, if for all u2 2 P2 there exists u1 2 P1 such that ku2kT  ku1kT. Clearly, if
P2 v P1, then each ku1kT such that u1 2 P1 can be written as a union of the truth sets
of some wﬀs in P2.
Deﬁnition 3. Let I1 ¼ ðP1; l1; j1Þ and I2 ¼ ðP2; l2; j2Þ be two information states. I2 is
a reﬁnement of I1, also denoted by I2 v I1, if both of the following conditions are
satisﬁed:
(1) P2 v P1.
(2) For each u 2 P1, if kukT = ¨16i6lkuikT for some set {u1, . . . ,ul}  P2, then
juj  l1ðuÞ ¼
Xl
i¼1
juij  l2ðuiÞ;
and
j1ðuÞ 6
Xl
i¼1
j2ðuiÞ:
Note that the arithmetic operations (addition and multiplication) and comparison
between vectors (and scalars) are deﬁned as usual. For example, the addition of two vec-
tors is carried out point-wise and results in a vector of the same dimension.
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partition P = {u1,u2,u3} such that ui = (Age, i) for i = 1,2,3. Then, I1 ¼ ðP; ðl0; l1Þ;
ðj0; j1ÞÞ is an information state for the data table in Fig. 1, where l0, l1, j0, and j1 are
speciﬁed as follows:
Let us further deﬁne P 0 = {w0,w1,u2,u3} such that w0 = u1 ^ (Sex,M) and w1 = u1 ^
(Sex,M). Obviously, P 0 is a logical partition. If l00; l01; j00, and j01 are speciﬁed as follows:
then I2 ¼ ðP0; ðl00;l01Þ; ðj00; j01ÞÞ is a reﬁnement of I1.
In our framework, there are two kinds of knowledge acquisition action that can reﬁne
the user’s information states. The ﬁrst is a query action, which is represented by a wﬀ u in
DL. The intended answer to the query is the distribution of conﬁdential values within the
selected population kukT in the database. The second type is an investigative action, which
is speciﬁed by a wﬀ u and a positive integer number k, and means that the user has inves-
tigated k individuals from the set kukT. For uniformity of representation, each knowledge
acquisition action is written as a = (u,k) for some DL wﬀ u and kP 0. When k > 0, it is
an investigative action, but it is a query action if k = 0.
Deﬁnition 4. (1) A knowledge acquisition action (u, 0) is applicable under the information
state I1 ¼ ðP1; l1; j1Þ and results in a state I2 ¼ ðP2; l2; j2Þ if
(a) there exists u 0 2 P1 such that kukT  ku 0kT,
(b) P2 = P1  {u 0} [ {u,u 0 ^ u},
(c) I2 is a reﬁnement of I1,
(d) j2(w) = j1(w) for any w 2 P1  {u 0}, and
(e) j2(u) + j2(u 0 ^ u) = j1(u 0).
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information state I1 ¼ ðP1; l1; j1Þ, and I2 ¼ ðP2; l2; j2Þ is a resultant state of the
application if
(a) u 2 P1 and k 6 juj 
Pt1
i¼0j1iðuÞ,
(b) P1 = P2,
(c) l1 = l2,
(d) j2(w) = j1(w) for any w5 u, and
(e)
Pt1
i¼0j2iðuÞ ¼
Pt1
i¼0j1iðuÞ þ k.
Since the goal of the user is to reﬁne his knowledge by the queries, a rational user would
pose his queries so that his knowledge would be improved by the answers to the queries.
Thus, if the user’s information state is (P1,l1,j1), he would pose a query about a subset of
an equivalence class in P1, which is the requirement of Condition 1a in Deﬁnition 4. After
the query has been answered, the corresponding equivalence class is partitioned into two
parts—one satisﬁes u and the other does not—so we have Condition 1b in Deﬁnition 4.
Condition 1c in Deﬁnition 4 further requires that the answer is correct; thus, the resultant
information state is a reﬁnement of the original one. Furthermore, since the query action
does not result in any new individuals being investigated, the j2 function agrees with j1 for
the part of the population not split by the query. Meanwhile, for the split part, the total
number of investigated individuals does not change, which is reﬂected in Conditions 1d
and 1e of the deﬁnition.
In the case of an investigative action, we assume the user will only investigate the indi-
viduals in a sub-population represented by a wﬀ in P1. The assumption is inessential,
since, if the investigated individuals are from diﬀerent sub-populations, the corresponding
investigative action can be decomposed into a sequence of actions that satisfy the applica-
bility condition. As it is assumed that the user knows the total number of individuals in
kukT and the number of those investigated by him so far is equal to
Pt1
i¼0jiðuÞ, the number
of individuals that he can investigate is at most the number of all un-investigated individ-
uals. This is required by the applicability condition of Deﬁnition 4(2a). Conditions 2b–2d
of the deﬁnition are obvious, since the values speciﬁed in the three conditions are not
aﬀected by the investigation. However, the investigation can aﬀect the total number of
investigated individuals in kukT, which is reﬂected in Condition 2e.
Example 3. Continuing with Example 2, let us ﬁrst apply the knowledge acquisition
action (w0,0) in the information state I1. Then, I3 ¼ ðP0; ðl00; l01Þ; ðj000 ; j001ÞÞ is a resultant
state, where j000, and j
00
1 are speciﬁed as follows:
If the knowledge acquisition action (u2,6) is further applied in state I3, then I2 will be a
possible next state. As the example shows, the resultant state of a query action is com-
D.-W. Wang et al. / Internat. J. Approx. Reason. 43 (2006) 179–201 187pletely determined by the data table if the query is correctly answered. However, the resul-
tant state of an investigative action is determined by the actual investigation results. Thus,
there may be more than one possible resultant state for an investigative action.4. The value of information
To quantitatively determine the value of information, we need a user model. Let us con-
sider the case where the user is an agent trying to use some conﬁdential information to aid
his decision-making in a game he plays with some individuals in the population U. The
agent can decide the rate he wants to charge an individual for playing the game (i.e.,
the admission fee). Furthermore, the rate is decided on an individual basis so that each
player may be charged a diﬀerent rate. if an individual agrees to play the game and pays
the fee, he would have a chance to gain some reward, which would be a loss to the agent.
The reward would be determined by the individual’s conﬁdential attribute value. Let ri
denote the reward of an individual with the conﬁdential attribute value si for 0 6 i 6 t  1.
Then, q ¼ ðr0; r1; . . . ; rt1Þ 2 Rt represents the loss vector of the agent.
Let I0 ¼ ðf>g; l0; j0Þ be the initial information state of the user, where > denotes any
tautology in DL and j0(u) = (0, . . . , 0); and let q be a given loss vector. The agent ﬁrst
decides the base rate of the game according to the expected loss which is derived from
his initial information state, i.e., R0 = q Æ l0(>). Thus, in the initial state, the expected pay-
oﬀ for the agent is zero. However, once he acquires extra information and reaches a new
information state, he can utilize that information to make a proﬁt.
We further assume that each individual will participate in the game if he is charged the
base rate, but, he can refuse if the agent charges him more than the base rate. The higher
the rate, the greater the likelihood the individual will refuse to play the game. If the infor-
mation state is I ¼ ðP; l; jÞ, where P = {u1, . . . ,um}, a reasonable decision by the agent
for the rate of an individual u satisfying u would be as follows.
(1) If u has been investigated and is known to have conﬁdential attribute value si, then
the most proﬁtable decision of the agent would be to charge the individual
max(R0, ri) so that his payoﬀ would be max(R0  ri, 0).
(2) If the individual has not been investigated, the agent knows that the probability of
the conﬁdential attribute value of u being si is
piðuÞ ¼
juj  liðuÞ  jiðuÞ
juj Pt1i¼0jiðuÞ : ð1ÞIn this case, the most reasonable decision by the agent would be to charge the indi-
vidual max R0;
Pt1
i¼0piðuÞ  ri
 
so that his expected payoﬀ would be
max R0 
Pt1
i¼0piðuÞ  ri; 0
 
.Thus, on average, the agent can expect the following payoﬀ, Bu, by playing the game
with an individual satisfying u:
Bu¼max R0
Xt1
i¼0
ðpiðuÞ riÞ;0
 !
 juj
Pt1
i¼0jiðuÞ
juj þ
Xt1
i¼0
maxðR0ri;0Þ jiðuÞjuj : ð2Þ
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rates of those who may incur a greater loss to him. Clearly, the value of the information
depends on how much he can beneﬁt by using it. The agent’s expected gain from each indi-
vidual is computed by
BI ¼
X
u2P
Bu  jujjU j ;
if he decides the rates according to the two principles above.
Example 4. The above scenario usually occurs between an insurance company and its
clients. The base rate is applied to a typical client if the company does not have further
information about his health condition. However, the company would raise the rates of
high risk clients, so the health information of such clients would be valuable to the
insurance company. To prevent the leakage of conﬁdential information, the data center
may increase the price for answering a query so that the value of information to the
company is counter-balanced and there would be no incentive to continue the investigation.
The notion of the value of information has been studied extensively in decision theory
[6,16]. In our model, as investigative actions are not allowed, all information states are of
the form (P,l,j0); hence, j0i(u) = 0 and pi(u) = li(u) for all 0 6 i 6 t  1, and u 2 P.
Consequently, BI can be simpliﬁed to
X
u2P
maxðR0  lðuÞ  q; 0Þ  jujjU j ;
which is the value of partial information deﬁned in [16] if our user model is appropriately
formulated as a decision problem of the agent. While, in our case, partial information is
obtained by querying the data center, another approach obtains partial information by
sampling, as suggested in [16]. Though sampling is similar to investigation, the informa-
tion obtained from the two kinds of action is quite diﬀerent. With sampling actions, even
though the chosen individuals may be thoroughly investigated, only statistical information
can be derived. This is the information used to predict the status of the whole population.
However, with investigative actions, the user can indeed obtain the personal information
about each investigated individual, but he cannot make any statistical inference about the
whole population from such information.
On the other hand, if no query actions are possible, the information states are always of
the form ({>},l0,j). Once all individuals have been fully investigated (though this is
hardly possible in any practical sense) the information state becomes a perfect state
I ¼ ðf>g; l0; jÞ, where ji(>) = l0i(>) Æ jUj, so pi(>) = 0 for all 0 6 i 6 t  1. Conse-
quently, BI can be simpliﬁed to
Xt1
i¼0
maxðR0  ri; 0Þ  l0ið>Þ;
which is precisely the value of perfect information deﬁned in [16]. Thus, we have modeled
the value of hybrid information in the above-deﬁned framework.
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According to the above user model, the user can improve his payoﬀ from 0 to BI when
his information state evolves from the initial state to I. If the information is free-
of-charge, the user would gladly receive it and the privacy of the individuals might be
invaded. Thus, one approach to improving privacy protection is to charge for answers
to queries so that the user cannot make a proﬁt by obtaining conﬁdential information.
This can be achieved by employing a pricing mechanism in the data center. However, since
the answer to a query may have diﬀerent eﬀects under diﬀerent information states, the
pricing mechanism must be adaptive to the query history of the user. In general, it is very
diﬃcult to design an adaptive pricing mechanism, since users may have to pay diﬀerent
prices for the same queries under diﬀerent situations. Therefore, instead of charging each
query separately, we consider a more restricted setting. Assume that each user is allowed
to ask a batch of queries only once, after which he could try to perform further investiga-
tive actions, but the data center would not answer any more queries. Thus, the pricing
mechanism decides the cost of each batch of queries so that the user cannot beneﬁt from
the answers.
Let (P,l,j) be the information state of the user after a sequence of queries and follow-
up investigative actions, where P = {u1,u2, . . . ,um}. Since the data center has no control
over how the user will use the information he receives, it can only guarantee that the cost
of obtaining the information is high enough to prevent him making a proﬁt from it, no
matter what further investigative actions he undertakes. Thus, based on the partial knowl-
edge stateP ¼ ðP; lÞ only, the data center must estimate the maximum payoﬀ to the agent
under diﬀerent information states compatible with P. Let k = (k1, . . . ,km) be an m-tuple of
non-negative integers and deﬁne
F k ¼ j
Xt1
i¼0
jiðujÞ
 ¼ kj; 81 6 j 6 m
( )
as the set of j functions that denote the possible investigation results when a speciﬁc num-
ber of individuals has been investigated. Let ISðP; kÞ denote the set of information states
ðP; jÞ such that j 2 Fk. In other words, ISðP; kÞ is the set of information states compat-
ible with P and k. Then, the maximal value of information obtained by the agent under P
and k is deﬁned as
BðP; kÞ ¼ maxfBIjI 2 ISðP; kÞg:
We further assume that a cost function cinv : UZþ ! Rþ is available to both the user
and the data center, where U is the set of DL wﬀs andZþ and Rþ are respectively the sets
of positive integers and real numbers. The intended meaning of cinv(u,k) is the cost of the
investigation of k individuals that satisfy u. It can be assumed that cinv is a super-linear
function in its second argument. Thus, when the user poses a batch of queries Q, the data
center knows what the resultant partial knowledge state P will be once the answer is re-
leased. Therefore, the price of Q must be decided before releasing the information. The
price, price(Q), of the answers to the batch of queries should be decided such that
jU j  BðP; kÞ 
Xm
i¼1
cinvðui; kiÞ 6 priceðQÞ ð3Þ
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max
k
jU j maxfBIjI 2 ISðP; kÞg 
Xm
i¼1
cinvðui; kiÞ
 !
; ð4Þ
where the domain of k is ﬁnite, since 0 6 ki 6 juij. The maximization (4) is a typical com-
binatorial optimization problem. However, the practical estimation of its value may be
computationally diﬃcult due to the large number of possible tuples k and information
states in each ISðP; kÞ. Non-classical techniques, such as genetic algorithms, might be
helpful in solving the maximization.
4.2. Usefulness of information
In our pricing mechanism, the data center assumes that the user can play the above-
mentioned game with all individuals in U and charge them according to the total gain
he expects to achieve. However, this may be an over-estimation, since the user cannot play
the game with all individuals when the population is large. To circumvent the problem, we
may assume that the user must spend some resources to play the game with each individ-
ual. Let cply : UZþ ! Rþ be another cost function such that cply(u, l) denotes the cost
of the user playing the game with l individuals that satisfy u. Given an m-tuple of non-
negative integers l = (l1, . . . , lm) and an information state I, deﬁne
BlI ¼
Xm
i¼1
Bui  li:
The price in (4) can be replaced by
max
k;l
maxfBlIjI 2 ISðP; kÞg 
Xm
i¼1
cinvðui; kiÞ 
Xm
i¼1
cplyðui; liÞ
 !
; ð5Þ
where the domains of both k and l are restricted to 0 6 ki, li 6 juij.
Intuitively, each li and kj represent the usefulness of information. Given two equivalent
classes in a logical partition, it may be easier to ﬁnd potential members in one equivalence
class than in the other, depending on the conditions each class satisﬁes. It may also be
easier, and thus cost-eﬀective, to investigate members of one equivalence class rather than
the other. Although these two factors may be closely related, they are not necessarily the
same.
Example 5. Using the insurance company model mentioned in Example 4, assume that
the world’s population is represented by all the adults in a country. One equivalence class
may be deﬁned as all the people living in the same county, while another class may be
deﬁned as all people whose weight is between 60 and 65 kg. It is easy for the ﬁrst group of
people to be investigated and added to a list of potential clients, but it is relatively diﬃcult
to investigate the second group.
Thus, the data center can decide the price of the answers to a batch of queries, Q, by a
two-level maximization procedure based on (4) or (5). The outer level maximization would
depend on the form of the cost functions cinv and/or cply, so it is unlikely that an analytic
solution could be found for it. However, the inner maximization can be decomposed into
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we have to ﬁnd j(u) that maximizes Bu among all j satisfying
Pt1
i¼0jiðuÞ ¼ k and
ji(u) 6 juj Æ li(u) for all 0 6 i 6 t  1. This, in turn, is equivalent to the following con-
straint optimization problem in the integer domain:
Maximize max R0 
Xt1
i¼0
ni  xi
N  k  ri; 0
 !
 N  k
N
þ
Xt1
i¼0
maxðR0  ri; 0Þ  xiN
s:t: x0 þ x1 þ    þ xt1 ¼ k; 0 6 xi 6 ni ð0 6 i 6 t  1Þ;
ð6Þ
where N and ni correspond to juj and juj Æ li(u) respectively. The solution of Eq. (6) can be
given by the following proposition for k 6 N. Without loss of generality, we assume
r0P r1P   P rt1 for the loss vector in the proposition.
Proposition 1. Assume N ¼Pt1i¼0ni.
(1) If k = N, then the solution of Eq. (6) is xi = ni for 0 6 i 6 t  1 and its maximum value
is
Xt1
i¼0
maxðR0  ri; 0Þ  niN :
(2) If k < N and l is the smallest natural number such that
Pl
i¼0ni > k, then the solution of
Eq. (6) is
xi ¼
ni if i < l;
k Pl1
i¼0
ni if i ¼ l;
0 if i > l;
8>><
>>:
and its maximum value is
max R0 
Xt1
i¼lþ1
ni
N  k  ri þ
Pl
i¼0ni  k
N  k  rl; 0
 !
 N  k
N
þ
Xl1
i¼0
maxðR0  ri; 0Þ  niN
þmaxðR0  rl; 0Þ  k 
Pl1
i¼0ni
N
:
High risk individuals are those who may cause a greater loss to the agent. For low risk
individuals, the investigation cannot improve the payoﬀ for the agent; however, for high
risk ones, the investigation can indeed reduce the agent’s potential loss, because he can
raise their admission fees appropriately. The more that high risk individuals are investi-
gated, the more the agent can reduce his potential loss; therefore, the maximum payoﬀ
occurs when individuals with the highest risk are investigated ﬁrst. This intuition is veriﬁed
by the preceding proposition.
5. The damage caused by and compensation for privacy leakage
To model the damage caused by and compensation for privacy leakage, we consider
another game played between an agent, called the accuser, and the individuals in U.
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ðd0; d1; . . . ; dt1Þ 2 Rt and ðc0; c1; . . . ; ct1Þ 2 Rt are respectively the damage and compen-
sation vectors of the game. The rules of the game are as follows: If an individual is accused
of si and he actually has the conﬁdential attribute value si, then the damage to him is di,
which is also the reward of the accuser. However, if he is accused of si and his conﬁdential
attribute value is not si, then he receives compensation ci from the accuser. Thus, if
I ¼ ðP; l; jÞ is an information state, the agent who accuses an un-investigated individual
satisfying u 2 P of si would risk losing
LiðuÞ ¼ ð1 piðuÞÞci  piðuÞdi; ð7Þ
where pi(u) is as deﬁned by (1). The task of privacy protection, therefore, is to make the
dissemination of individuals’ conﬁdential information unproﬁtable for the accuser. This is
achieved by raising the accuser’s expected loss to a threshold, which should be high en-
ough to deter any rational agent risking such a loss. However, for ease of presentation,
we assume the threshold is zero. Thus, an information state I ¼ ðP; l; jÞ is said to be safe
if Li(u)P 0 for all u 2 P and 0 6 i 6 t  1.
Example 6. Assume a person has faulty genes that increase the risk of developing some
rare disease. This person’s job application may be rejected, since a prospective employer
may feel he is more likely to become ill and his work performance would probably suﬀer.
By using the above information, the employer could discriminate against, and therefore
harm, the applicant.5.1. The basic model
An agent’s query can only be answered if his information state will be safe after receiv-
ing the answer. It can be seen that an information state I ¼ ðP; l; jÞ is safe if piðuÞ 6 ciciþdi
for any u 2 P and 0 6 i 6 t  1. However, since pi(u) not only depends on li(u), but also
on how many individuals have been investigated by the user, the data center cannot decide
if answering a query will lead to a safe state. To guarantee the safety of an information
state, the data center can use a worst-case analysis. Assume that for each wﬀ u, the user
can investigate at most Ku individuals in juj at an aﬀordable cost. Then, given a partial
knowledge state P ¼ ðP; lÞ, which results from the answer to a query, the data center
can guarantee the safety of the answer, no matter which (aﬀordable) investigation is made
by the user, as long as the following condition holds for all u 2 P and 0 6 i 6 t  1:
juj  liðuÞ
juj  Ku 6
ci
ci þ di ; ð8Þ
since, by (1),
piðuÞ 6
juj  liðuÞ
juj  Ku :
Condition (8) can be rewritten as
liðuÞ 6
ci
ci þ di  1
Ku
juj
 
: ð9Þ
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(1) If no investigative actions are possible, i.e., Ku = 0, then (9) is satisﬁed if liðuÞ 6 ciciþdi.
In such a case, if di = 0 or ci di, then the information state is still safe, even though
li(u) is approximately equal to 1. This means that the revelation of an individual
being si will not harm that individual, or the compensation will be suﬃciently large
to cover the damage caused to him. Hence, it does not matter if the user can almost
certainly discover that a class of individuals has si value. On the other hand, if
ci  di > 0, then the information state is only safe when li(u) is less than 0.5. In other
words, if the compensation cannot cover the damage suﬃciently, then the user should
not be allowed to know a conﬁdential value with a certainty above 0.5.
(2) If investigation is allowed for at most Ku individuals, then, to maintain safety, the
upper bound of li(u) is discounted by the ratio 1 Kujuj. The discount eﬀect is
alleviated when juj  Ku; thus, the larger the size of kuk, the greater the possibility
of achieving the safety requirement. This corresponds to the k-anonymity require-
ment for privacy protection in [24].
Based on the safety criterion, the data center can decide whether the user’s query should
be answered or refused. However, note that (9) is only a suﬃcient condition for the safety
of data release, so we may not have to test it for every i and u. In particular, if di = 0, then
Li(u)P 0 holds no matter how the investigative actions are carried out, so we only have to
test (9) for those i such that di > 0.
An alternative approach is to use a pricing mechanism to discourage the user. To for-
mulate this approach, we need another cost function cacc : UZþ ! Rþ, where cacc(u,k)
denotes the cost to the user for accusing k individuals that satisfy u. The minimum loss the
user may incur under the partial knowledge state P ¼ ðP;lÞ should then be
L	ðuÞ ¼ min
k;l
Xt1
i¼0
Liðu; kÞ  li þ cinv u;
Xt1
i¼0
ki
 !
þ cacc u;
Xt1
i¼0
li
 !" #
;
where
Liðu; kÞ ¼ ci  ðci þ diÞ  juj  liðuÞ  kijuj Pt1i¼0ki
is the result of substituting (1) into (7) when ji(u) = ki for 0 6 i 6 t  1; and the minimi-
zation has taken over all ki 6 juj Æ li(u) for 0 6 i 6 t  1 and li such that
Pt1
i¼0li 6 juj.
Then, if the answer to a batch of queries results in a partial knowledge state (P,l), its price
should be determined by
P
u2PpriceðuÞ, where the price of each u is in accordance with the
following equation:
priceðuÞ ¼ L
	ðuÞ; if L	ðuÞ < 0
0; otherwise:
5.2. The extended model
In the basic model, we assume the damage vector is associated with each speciﬁc value
of the conﬁdential attribute. This means that if an individual is known to have the
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if an individual’s attribute value is known to be in some speciﬁc subset of Vc, even if the
subset is not a singleton.
Example 7. Assume a disease is classiﬁed in stages according to a range 0–5, where 0
means no disease, 1–3 can be cured, and 4–5 are terminal. Then, the knowledge that a
person has been diagnosed as stage 4 or stage 5 could be harmful to that person if it
became widely known.
The basic model can be extended to cover such a case. Since it is reasonable that the
compensation should be in proportion to the amount of damage caused, we can simplify
the model by assuming that there is a function a : R! R that maps each damage value to
a corresponding level of compensation. For example, it may be the case that a(x) = r Æ x
for some positive number r. Thus, in the extended model, we can concentrate on estimat-
ing the damage. In the model, we assume there is a damage function d : ð2f0;...;t1g
f;gÞ ! R. For any S  {0, . . . , t  1}, d(S) means the damage to an individual when it
is known that his conﬁdential attribute value belongs to {siji 2 S}. Using the same game
rules as the basic model, the expected loss to the agent accusing an individual in u 2 P
of {siji 2 S} would be
LSðuÞ ¼ 1
X
i2S
piðuÞ
 !
aðdðSÞÞ 
X
i2S
piðuÞ
 !
dðSÞ;
where pi(u) is deﬁned by (1). Then, the safety criterion for an information state
I ¼ ðP; l; jÞ can be extended to
LSðuÞP 0
for all u 2 P and S  {0, . . . , t  1}. This is equivalent toX
i2S
piðuÞ 6
aðdðSÞÞ
aðdðSÞÞ þ dðSÞ : ð10Þ
By using the same worst-case analysis as in the basic model, the following must be satisﬁed
for all u 2 P and S  {0, . . . , t  1},X
i2S
juj  liðuÞ
juj  Ku 6
aðdðSÞÞ
aðdðSÞÞ þ dðSÞ ;
or alternatively in the following form:X
i2S
liðuÞ 6
aðdðSÞÞ
aðdðSÞÞ þ dðSÞ
 
 1 Kujuj
 
: ð11Þ
So far, the model has not addressed the estimation of the damage function d. In fact, as the
damage vector in the basic model should be determined by some external mechanism, such
as the legal system or social conventions, we can assume that d({i}) = di is given for each
0 6 i 6 t  1. However, for other values of the damage function, it should be possible to
impose some reasonable constraints so that the damage caused by a subset S can be
(partially) estimated by the damage caused by its elements. These conditions include
(1) d({0, . . . , t  1}) = 0,
(2) d(S1) 6 d(S2) if S2  S1,
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(4) d(S) = mini2Sd({i}).
Note that we do not require that all these conditions hold simultaneously. In general,
Condition 1 should hold for all damage functions; however, Conditions 2–4 are optional.
Condition 1 means that if there is no privacy leakage, there is no damage. Since it is
known that all possible values of the conﬁdential attribute are in Vc, the index set
{0, . . . , t  1} corresponds to the state of no privacy leakage. Condition 2 means the more
speciﬁc the information known, the greater the damage that is likely to be caused. Condi-
tion 3 corresponds to the basic model in which only the damage value of the singleton is
considered. Condition 4 is based on the principle of least commitment, which implies that
if an individual is accused of a set of possible faults disjunctively, it can only be assumed
that he has the least harmful fault. Therefore, the damage caused to him by such an accu-
sation would be equivalent to the minimal damage caused by accusing him of a fault in the
set. Note that Conditions 3 and 4 are not compatible if there are at least two indices, i and
j, such that d({i}) > 0 and d({j}) > 0. However, both Conditions 1 and 2 are implied by
Condition 3, and Condition 4 implies Condition 2. Furthermore, Condition 4 also implies
Condition 1, provided that i exists such that d({i}) = 0.
An alternative way to estimate the damage value of a subset is by the information-the-
oretic approach. In other words, if the a priori probability function of the possible values
of the conﬁdential attribute is given by l(>), then we can compute the a posteriori prob-
ability for any S  {0,1, . . . , t  1} as
PrðsijSÞ ¼
lið>ÞP
j2Sljð>Þ
; if i 2 S;
0; otherwise:
8<
:
Then, a possible constraint on the damage function is
dðSÞ ¼
X
i2S
mðlið>Þ; Prðsi j SÞÞ  dðfigÞ; ð12Þ
where m : [0,1] · [0, 1]! [0, 1] is called an information distance function. The function
estimates how much the user’s information about some speciﬁc si would be increased by
knowing that its index is in S. Typically, the information distance function can be deﬁned
as the relative diﬀerence between the entropy values of the two probabilities, i.e.,
mðp; qÞ ¼ log p  log q
log p
:
If the information distance function is deﬁned in this way, then (12) can be reduced to
dðSÞ ¼ log pS 
X
i2S
dðfigÞ
log pi
; ð13Þ
where pi = li(>) and pS ¼
P
i2Slið>Þ. Consequently, of the four conditions mentioned
above, only Condition 1 is satisﬁed by the entropy-based damage function.
6. Related works
Although quantifying the value of information is by no means a novel problem, our
quantitative models for privacy protection provide a new perspective on the matter. As
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While decision-theoretic analysis [16] emphasizes the value of information from the deci-
sion-maker’s viewpoint, our model is primarily concerned with privacy protection by the
information provider. For the former, a decision-maker can decide if he purchases a piece
of information according to the value of the information. For the latter, the information
provider can charge the user of the information an appropriate fee.
An alternative model for measuring the value of information in the context of privacy
protection is proposed in [2–4,25]. In the model, the value of information is estimated
according to the expected cost incurred by the user to achieve a perfect knowledge state
from the given information. More speciﬁcally, let a piece of information be a pair
(u, (ni)06i6t1) such that u is a DL wﬀ and juj ¼
Pt1
i¼0ni. The information (u, (ni)06i6t1)
means that, in the sub-population kukT, there are exactly ni individuals with conﬁdential
attribute value si for 0 6 i 6 t  1. To know the conﬁdential values of all individuals sat-
isfying u, the user can investigate them one by one. Assume the cost of investigating each
individual is ﬁxed, then the total cost is proportional to the number of individuals the user
must investigate to know all individuals’ conﬁdential values. Though the maximum num-
ber of investigative actions the user must perform may be equal to juj, a piece of informa-
tion (u, (ni)06i6t1) may help him reduce the investigation cost. An extreme case would be
when ni = juj and nj = 0 for all 1 6 j5 i 6 t  1. In such a case, the user would not have
to carry out an investigation since he would know that all individuals have the conﬁdential
value si. Though the model in [2–4,25] is restricted to the case where the domain of values
for the conﬁdential attribute has exactly two elements, the result can be generalized
according to the following proposition.Proposition 2. Given a piece of information (u, (ni)06i6t1), the expected number of
investigative actions required to know the confidential values of all individuals satisfying u is
Xt1
i¼0
ni  ðjuj  niÞ
juj  ni þ 1 : ð14Þ
The value of information by Eq. (14) is based on the rationale that the more a piece of
information can be used to reduce the investigation eﬀort, the more valuable it is. Thus,
the value of information can be deﬁned as a monotonically decreasing function of (14).
However, without the user model, the value of information based on (14) may not reﬂect
the real situation. For example, (14) is obviously invariant under the permutation of ni. In
other words, if r : {0, . . . , t  1}! {0, . . . , t  1} is a permutation of the index set, then
Xt1
i¼0
ni  ðjuj  niÞ
juj  ni þ 1 ¼
Xt1
i¼0
nrðiÞ  ðjuj  nrðiÞÞ
juj  nrðiÞ þ 1 :
This means that two pieces of information, (u1, (ni)06i6t1) and (u2, (nr(i))06i6t1), have the
same value if ju1j = ju2j. However, in practice, knowing that most individuals have con-
ﬁdential value s0 may have a diﬀerent value than knowing that the same number of indi-
viduals have conﬁdential value s1.
Example 8. Let the conﬁdential attribute denote a HIV test result and Vc = {+,} (i.e.,
t = 2). Then, given two sub-populations of size 10,000 characterized by u1 and u2
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different values in terms of privacy protection, since the former says that most
individuals in the sub-population are infected, whereas the latter says the opposite. Our
model deals with the problem by imposing different loss values, r0 and r1, on the two
test results.
Besides decision-theoretic analysis, the value of information can also be estimated by
some information theoretic measures. The central notion of such measures is the entropy
introduced by Shannon [21]. In machine learning literature, it is used to deﬁne the infor-
mation gain of an attribute for a classiﬁcation problem [17]. By reformulating Shannon’s
notion to ﬁt our context, the entropy of a partial knowledge state P ¼ ðP; lÞ is deﬁned by
HðPÞ ¼
X
u2P
juj
jU j 
Xt1
i¼0
liðuÞ  log
1
liðuÞ
:
The information gain derived from a partial knowledge state is deﬁned as the diﬀerence
between its entropy and that of the initial information state, i.e.,
GainðPÞ ¼ HðP0Þ  HðPÞ;
where P0 ¼ ðf>g; l0Þ is the partial knowledge state compatible with the initial informa-
tion state. Though information gain is a useful index for selecting the most informative
features for the classiﬁcation problem, the deﬁnition of entropy does not consider the
asymmetric sensitivity of conﬁdential attribute values.
In contrast to the quantitative approach of this paper, some qualitative criteria for pri-
vacy protection have been proposed in [9,11,20,24,23]. These criteria are designed to protect
sensitive personal information in a released microdata set, i.e., a set of records containing
information about individuals. The main objective is to prevent the re-identiﬁcation of indi-
viduals; that is, to prevent the possibility of deducing which record corresponds to a partic-
ular individual, even though the explicit identiﬁer of the individual is not contained in the
released information. In contrast, our models are concerned with the release of statistical
information, which is generally less speciﬁc than microdata. However, microdata release
can also be handled by our framework when the queries are suﬃciently speciﬁc. Let us deﬁne
a complete speciﬁcation formula (CSF) as a DL wﬀ of the form ^a2A (a,va), where A is the
set of all easy-to-know attributes and va is a value in the domain ofA. The answer to a batch
of queriesQ consisting of all CSF’s is equivalent to releasing themicrodata of the whole data
table T. Therefore, our models are applicable in a more general context.
Irrespective of diﬀerent application contexts, our models are still comparable with qual-
itative models. In the description of the l-ARGUS system [11], it is emphasized that re-
identiﬁcation of an individual can occur if the individual has an easy-to-know attribute
value that is rare in the population. In our notation, this means that when a query u is
posed, if juj is small, then it is rather unsafe to answer the query. In particular, if
juj = 1, then the answer to the query necessarily results in the re-identiﬁcation of the indi-
vidual satisfying u. This intuition is formally investigated in [24,23]. In that framework, a
formal requirement, called k-anonymity, is deﬁned, and generalization and suppression
techniques are employed to ensure that the requirement is satisﬁed. Generally speaking,
k-anonymity requires that each bin must contain at least k individuals, where a bin is
deﬁned as an equivalence class of individuals who have exactly the same easy-to-know
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[12,15,18,25]. The k-anonymity requirement can be easily enforced in our model, if it is
restricted so that a query u cannot be answered if the size juj is smaller than some thres-
hold. However, instead of generalizing or suppressing the data, we try to assess its poten-
tial value or the damage that would be caused by its release, and discourage misuse of the
information by some pricing or penalty mechanism.
In Section 5.1, we noted that, when the size of juj is large enough, the safety require-
ment for answering the query u in our model can be achieved more easily. This also indi-
rectly validates why k-anonymity is useful for privacy protection. Indeed, the diversity of
conﬁdential attribute values tends to be higher in a larger (sub)population. However, the-
oretically speaking, k-anonymity does not fully exclude the possibility of privacy leakage.
Imagine a case where all individuals in the bin have the same conﬁdential value. The sen-
sitive information of the individuals would be simultaneously leaked if the data were to be
released, even though the bin size criterion is satisﬁed. To circumvent the problem, a log-
ical criterion is proposed in [2–4,9,25]. It is based on the possible world semantics of epi-
stemic logic [7], so it is possible to rigorously deﬁne what a user (or an intruder) knows.
The release of data is then said to be (logically) safe if it does not result in the conﬁdential
information being known by the user. The quantitative models deﬁned in this paper can be
seen as generalizations of the logical model. Let us temporarily leave aside the investigative
actions and consider an information state (P,l,j0) such that j0i(u) = 0 for all u 2 P and
0 6 i 6 t  1. If for some u 2 P, we have li(u) = 1 and lj(u) = 0 for j5 i, then according
to (7), the information state is unsafe if di > 0. This corresponds to the case in the logical
model where the user knows that all individuals satisfying u have the conﬁdential value si.
In addition, since di > 0, the information is sensitive, so the information state is also unsafe
according to the logical criterion. However, even though the user cannot know any indi-
vidual’s sensitive information with certainty, the knowledge of the distribution of the con-
ﬁdential attribute values within a group of individuals may increase the risk of privacy
invasion. Our quantitative models improve this aspect of the logical criterion. Moreover,
the k-anonymity requirement can still be considered as complementary to the logical cri-
terion, since the latter does not consider the size of the population, which is another aspect
handled by the investigative actions in our models. Both the k-anonymity requirement and
the logical criterion are implemented in the Cellsecu system [3,25].Example 9. Let us reconsider the conﬁdential attribute of the HIV test result, where
Vc = {+,}. Assume the damage caused by and compensation for the ‘‘+’’ result being
known are respectively r and 5r for some r > 0, and that the user can investigate at most
one individual at an affordable cost. By substituting di and ci in (9) with r and 5r
respectively, the safety condition is l0ðuÞ 6 56  ð1 1jujÞ. Now, for a partial knowledge state
P ¼ ðfu;:ug; lÞ, if juj = juj = 2 and l0ðuÞ ¼ l0ð:uÞ ¼ 12, then by the logical criterion,
P is a safe knowledge state, even though it is unsafe according to the 3-anonymity
requirement. Since l0ðuÞ ¼ 12 > 512 ¼ 56  1 1juj
 
, the unsafe state can be detected by the
quantitative criterion proposed in this paper.
On the other hand, if juj = juj = 10, but l0(u) = 1, then P satisﬁes the k-anonymity
requirement up to k 6 10, even though the logical criterion of safety is obviously violated.
The violation of logical safety can still be detected by the quantitative criterion, since
l0ðuÞ ¼ 1 > 34 ¼ 56  1 1juj
 
.
D.-W. Wang et al. / Internat. J. Approx. Reason. 43 (2006) 179–201 1997. Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented two quantitative models for privacy protection. In
both, a formal representation of the user’s information states is given. In the ﬁrst model,
we estimate the value of information to the user by considering a speciﬁc user model.
Under this model, the objective of privacy protection is to ensure that a user cannot
proﬁt from obtaining conﬁdential information. It must be emphasized that the value
of information is deﬁned in terms of this particular user model. When other user models
are considered, the value of information may be diﬀerent. Some examples can be found
in [14].
In the second model, we assume that the damage caused by and compensation for
revealing each speciﬁc conﬁdential value is known. An information state is safe when there
is only a small probability that a user could discover a conﬁdential value that would cause
a large amount of damage if it were revealed.
A problem with the pricing mechanism arises naturally, since diﬀerent users may put
diﬀerent values on the same information. This means that we may have to set diﬀerent
prices for diﬀerent users of the same information. However, this is not as odd as it seems
at ﬁrst. In fact, diﬀerent pricing structures are already applied in the software market,
usually for educational and commercial uses. Of course, this also means that more experi-
mental studies are needed before the models can be put to practical use. In [3,25], a
prototypical system has been implemented to test the eﬀectiveness of several safety criteria
for privacy protection. In the future, we will extend the system to conduct experiments on
the models proposed in this paper.
There are other complicated problems in privacy protection that cannot be resolved by
purely technical means. For example, our schemes cannot prevent a group of users from
collectively investigating conﬁdential information by individually querying a data center.
This must be considered from a legal standpoint. Upon releasing data to a user, the user
must be required to sign a contract prohibiting him from revealing the data to others. The
possibility of collusion by a group of users would thus be prohibited by law. In future
works, we will investigate how technology and privacy laws can be fully combined to pro-
tect privacy.Appendix A. Proof of Proposition 2
Let us deﬁne a (u, (ni)06i6t1)-trace (or simply a trace) as a string of symbols in Vc, the
domain of values for the conﬁdential attribute, where si occurs ni times for 0 6 i 6 t  1
and set N = juj. A trace is a possible result when the user investigates the individuals in
kukT one by one. If the last k symbols of a trace are all si for some i and the symbol
before the last k symbols is sj for some j5 i, then the number of investigative actions
the user has to perform is in fact N  k, since after the (N  k)th individual has been
investigated, the user knows the remaining individuals have the conﬁdential value si
according to the information. Let us call such trace a (k, si)-trace. For each i and
0 < k 6 ni , there are in total
X
j 6¼i
ðN  k  1Þ!Q
l 6¼i;jnl!  ðnj  1Þ!  ðni  kÞ!
ðA:1Þ
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Pt1
i¼0ni, (A.1) can be rewritten asX
j 6¼i
ðN  k  1Þ!  njQ
l 6¼inl!  ðni  kÞ!
¼ ðN  k  1Þ!  ðN  niÞQ
l 6¼inl!  ðni  kÞ!
: ðA:2Þ
Because the total number of possible traces is
N !Qt1
l¼0nl!
; ðA:3Þ
the probability of a trace being a (k, si)-trace is the division of (A.2) by (A.3), i.e.,
ðN  k  1Þ!  ni!  ðN  niÞ
N !  ðni  kÞ! : ðA:4Þ
Thus, the expected number of investigative actions the user has to perform to discover all
individuals’ conﬁdential values is equal to
Xt1
i¼0
Xni
k¼1
ðN  k  1Þ!  ni!  ðN  niÞ
N !  ðni  kÞ!  ðN  kÞ; ðA:5Þ
which can be further rewritten as
Xt1
i¼0
Xni
k¼1
ðN  kÞ!  ni!
N !  ðni  kÞ!
 !
 ðN  niÞ: ðA:6Þ
According to [8] (pp. 173–174, Problem 1),
Xni
k¼0
ni
k
 
N
k
  ¼ N þ 1
N  ni þ 1 ;
so
Xni
k¼1
ðN  kÞ!  ni!
N !  ðni  kÞ! ¼
ni
N  ni þ 1 ;
therefore, (A.6) can be simpliﬁed into
Xt1
i¼0
ni  ðN  niÞ
N  ni þ 1 ; ðA:7Þ
which is exactly (14), since juj = N. h
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